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Abstract
We consider dynamic programming problems with a large time horizon, and give suf-
ficient conditions for the existence of the uniform value. As a consequence, we obtain
an existence result when the state space is precompact, payoffs are uniformly contin-
uous and the transition correspondence is non expansive. In the same spirit, we give
an existence result for the limit value. We also apply our results to Markov decision
processes and obtain a few generalizations of existing results.
Key words. Uniform value, Dynamic programming, Markov decision processes, limit
value, Blackwell optimality, average payoffs, long-run values, precompact state space,
non expansive correspondence.
1 Introduction
We first and mainly consider deterministic dynamic programming problems with
infinite time horizon. We assume that payoffs are bounded and denote, for each
n, the value of the n-stage problem with average payoffs by vn. By definition,
the problem has a limit value v if (vn) converges to v. It has a uniform value v
if: (vn) converges to v, and for each ε > 0 there exists a play giving a payoff not
lower than v − ε in any sufficiently long n-stage problem. So when the uniform
value exists, a decision maker can play ε-optimally simultaneously in any long
enough problem.
In 1987, Mertens asked whether the uniform convergence of (vn)n was enough
to imply the existence of the uniform value. Monderer and Sorin (1993), and
Lehrer and Monderer (1994) answered by the negative. In the context of zero-
sum stochastic games, Mertens and Neyman (1981) provided sufficient conditions,
of bounded variation type, on the discounted values to ensure the existence of
the uniform value. We give here new sufficient conditions for the existence of this
value.
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We define, for every m and n, the value vm,n as the supremum payoff the
decision maker can achieve when his payoff is defined as the average reward
computed between stages m+1 and m+n. We also define the value wm,n as the
supremum payoff the decision maker can achieve when his payoff is defined as the
minimum, for t in {1, .., n}, of his average rewards computed between stagesm+1
and m + t. We prove in theorem 3.7 that if the set W = {wm,n, m ≥ 0, n ≥ 1},
endowed with the supremum distance, is a precompact metric space, then the
uniform value v exists, and we have the equalities: v = supm≥0 infn≥1wm,n(z)
= supm≥0 infn≥1 vm,n(z) = infn≥1 supm≥0 vm,n(z) = infn≥1 supm≥0wm,n(z). In the
same spirit, we also provide in theorem 3.10 a simple existence result for the
limit value: if the set {vn, n ≥ 1}, endowed with the supremum distance, is
precompact, then the limit value v exists, and we have v = supm≥0 infn≥1 vm,n(z)
= infn≥1 supm≥0 vm,n(z). These results, together with a few corollaries of theorem
3.7, are stated in section 3.
Section 4 is devoted to the proofs of theorems 3.7 and 3.10. Section 5 contains
a counter-example to the existence of the uniform value, comments about 0-
optimal plays, stationary ε-optimal plays, and discounted payoffs. In particular,
we show that the existence of the uniform value is slightly stronger than: the
existence of a limit for the discounted values, together with the existence of ε-
Blackwell optimal plays, i.e. plays which are ε-optimal in any discounted problem
with low enough discount factor (see Rosenberg al., 2002).
We finally consider in section 6 (probabilistic) Markov decision processes
(MDP hereafter) and show: 1) in a usual MDP with finite set of states and
arbitrary set of actions, the uniform value exists, and 2) if the decision maker can
randomly select his actions, the same result also holds when there is imperfect
observation of the state.
This work was motivated by the study of a particular class of repeated games
generalizing those introduced in Renault, 2006. Corollary 3.8 can also be used to
prove the existence of the uniform value in a specific class of stochastic games,
which leads to the existence of the value in general repeated games with an
informed controller. This is done in a companion paper (see Renault, 2007).
Finally, the ideas presented here may also be used in continuous time to study
some non expansive optimal control problems (see Quincampoix Renault, 2009).
2 Model
We consider a dynamic programming problem (Z, F, r, z0) where: Z is a non
empty set, F is a correspondence from Z to Z with non empty values, r is a
mapping from Z to [0, 1], and z0 ∈ Z.
Z is called the set of states, F is the transition correspondence, r is the reward
(or payoff) function, and z0 is called the initial state. The interpretation is the
following. The initial state is z0, and a decision maker (also called player) first
has to select a new state z1 in F (z0), and is rewarded by r(z1). Then he has to
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choose z2 in F (z1), has a payoff of r(z2), etc... We have in mind a decision maker
who is interested in maximizing his “long-run average payoffs”, i.e. quantities
1
t
(r(z1)+ r(z2)+ ...+ r(zt)) for t large. From now on we fix Γ = (Z, F, r), and for
every state z0 we denote by Γ(z0) = (Z, F, r, z0) the corresponding problem with
initial state z0.
For z0 in Z, a play at z0 is a sequence s = (z1, ..., zt, ...) ∈ Z
∞ such that: ∀t ≥
1, zt ∈ F (zt−1). We denote by S(z0) the set of plays at z0, and by S = ∪z0∈ZS(z0)
the set of all plays. For n ≥ 1 and s = (zt)t≥1 ∈ S, the average payoff of s up to
stage n is defined by:
γn(s) =
1
n
n∑
t=1
r(zt).
And the n-stage value of Γ(z0) is: vn(z0) = sup
s∈S(z0)
γn(s).
Definition 2.1. Let z be in Z.
The liminf value of Γ(z) is v−(z) = lim infn vn(z).
The limsup value of Γ(z) is v+(z) = lim supn vn(z).
We say that the decision maker can guarantee, or secure, the payoff x in Γ(z)
if there exists a play s at z such that lim infn γn(s) ≥ x.
The lower long-run average value is defined by:
v(z) = sup{x ∈ IR, the decision maker can guarantee x in Γ(z)}
= sup
s∈S(z)
(
lim inf
n
γn(s)
)
.
Claim 2.2. v(z) ≤ v−(z) ≤ v+(z).
Definition 2.3.
The problem Γ(z) has a limit value if v−(z) = v+(z).
The problem Γ(z) has a uniform value if v(z) = v+(z).
When the limit value exists, we denote it by v(z) = v−(z) = v+(z). For ε ≥ 0,
a play s in S(z) such that lim infn γn(s) ≥ v(z) − ε is then called an ε-optimal
play for Γ(z).
On the one hand, the notion of limit value corresponds to the case where the
decision maker wants to maximize the quantities 1
t
(r(z1)+ r(z2)+ ...+ r(zt)) for t
large and known. On the other hand, the notion of uniform value is related to the
case where the decision maker is interested in maximizing his long-run average
payoffs without knowing the time horizon, i.e. quantities 1
t
(r(z1)+r(z2)+...+r(zt))
for t large and unknown. We clearly have:
Claim 2.4. Γ(z) has a uniform value if and only if Γ(z) has a limit value v(z)
and for every ε > 0 there exists an ε-optimal play for Γ(z).
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Remark 2.5. The uniform value is related to the notion of average cost criterion
(see Araposthathis et al., 1993, or Herna´ndez-Lerma and Lasserre, 1996). For
example, a play s in S(z) is said to be “strong Average-Cost optimal in the sense
of Flynn” if limn(γn(s) − vn(z)) = 0. Notice that (vn(z)) is not assumed to
converge here. A 0-optimal play for Γ(z) satisfies this optimality condition, but
in general ε-optimal plays do not.
Remark 2.6. Discounted payoffs.
Other type of evaluations are used. For λ ∈ (0, 1], the λ-discounted payoff of a
play s = (zt)t is defined by: γλ(s) =
∑∞
t=1 λ(1−λ)
t−1r(zt). And the λ-discounted
value of Γ(z) is vλ(z) = sups∈S(z) γλ(s).
An Abel mean can be written as an infinite convex combination of Cesaro
means, and it is possible to show that lim supλ→0 vλ(z) ≤ lim supn→∞ vn(z)
(Lehrer Sorin, 1992). One may have that limλ→0vλ(z) and limn→∞vn(z) both
exist and differ, however it is known that the uniform convergence of (vλ)λ is
equivalent to the uniform convergence of (vn)n, and whenever this type of con-
vergence holds the limits are necessarily the same (Lehrer Sorin, 1992).
A play s at z0 is said to be Blackwell optimal in Γ(z0) if there exists λ0 > 0 such
that for all λ ∈ (0, λ0], γλ(s) ≥ vλ(z0). Blackwell optimality has been extensively
studied after the seminal work of Blackwell (1962) who prove the existence of such
plays in the context of MDP with finite sets of states and actions (see subsection
6.1) . A survey can be found in Hordijk and Yushkevich, 2002.
In general Blackwell optimal plays do not exist, and a play s at z0 is said to
be ε-Blackwell optimal in Γ(z0) if there exists λ0 > 0 such that for all λ ∈ (0, λ0],
γλ(s) ≥ vλ(z0) − ε. We will prove at the end of section 5 that : 1) if Γ(z) has
a uniform value v(z), then (vλ(z))λ converges to v(z), and ε-Blackwell optimal
plays exist for each positive ε. And 2) the converse is false. Consequently, the
notion of uniform value is (slightly) stronger than the existence of a limit for vλ
and ε-Blackwell optimal plays.
3 Main results
We will give in the sequel sufficient conditions for the existence of the uniform
value. We start with general notations and lemmas.
Definition 3.1. For s = (zt)t≥1 in S, m ≥ 0 and n ≥ 1, we set:
γm,n(s) =
1
n
n∑
t=1
r(zm+t) and νm,n(s) = min{γm,t(s), t ∈ {1, ..., n}}.
We have νm,n(s) ≤ γm,n(s), and γ0,n(s) = γn(s). We write νn(s) = ν0,n(s) =
min{γt(s), t ∈ {1, ..., n}}.
Definition 3.2. For z in Z, m ≥ 0, and n ≥ 1, we set:
vm,n(z) = sup
s∈S(z)
γm,n(s) and wm,n(z) = sup
s∈S(z)
νm,n(s).
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We have v0,n(z) = vn(s), and we also set wn(z) = w0,n(z). vm,n corresponds to
the case where the decision maker first makes m moves in order to reach a “good
initial state”, then plays n moves for payoffs. wm,n corresponds to the case where
the decision maker first makes m moves in order to reach a “good initial state”,
but then his payoff only is the minimum of his next n average rewards (as if some
adversary trying to minimize the rewards was then able to choose the length of
the remaining game). This has to be related to the notion of uniform value, which
requires the existence of plays giving high payoffs for any (large enough) length
of the game. Of course we have wm,n+1 ≤ wm,n ≤ vm,n and, since r takes values
in [0, 1],
nvn ≤ (m+ n)vm+n ≤ nvn +m and nvm,n ≤ (m+ n)vm+n ≤ nvm,n +m. (1)
We start with a few lemmas, which are true without assumption on the prob-
lem. We first show that whenever the limit value exists it has to be supm≥0 infn≥1 vm,n(z).
Lemma 3.3. ∀z ∈ Z,
v−(z) = sup
m≥0
inf
n≥1
vm,n(z).
Proof: For every m and n, we have vm,n(z) ≤ (1+m/n)vm+n(z), so for eachm we
get: infn≥1 vm,n(z) ≤ v
−(z). Consequently, supm≥0 infn≥1 vm,n(z) ≤ v
−(z), and it
remains to show that supm≥0 infn≥1 vm,n(z) ≥ v
−(z). Assume for contradiction
that there exists ε > 0 such that for each m ≥ 0, one can find n(m) ≥ 1 satisfying
vm,n(m)(z) ≤ v
−(z)− ε. Define now m0 = 0, and set by induction mk+1 = n(mk)
for each k ≥ 0. For each k, we have vmk,mk+1 ≤ v
−(z)− ε, and also:
(m1 + ...+mk)vm1+...+mk(z) ≤ m1vm1(z) +m2vm1,m2(z) + ...+mkvmk1 ,mk(z).
This implies vm1+...+mk(z) ≤ v
−(z) − ε. Since limk m1 + .... + mk = +∞, we
obtain a contradiction with the definition of v−(z). 
The next lemmas show that the quantities wm,n are not that low.
Lemma 3.4. ∀k ≥ 1, ∀n ≥ 1, ∀m ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ Z,
vm,n(z) ≤ sup
l≥0
wl,k(z) +
k − 1
n
.
Proof: Fix k, n, m and z. Set A = supl≥0wl,k(z), and consider ε > 0.
By definition of vm,n(z), there exists a play s at z such that γm,n(s) ≥ vm,n(z)−
ε. For any i ≥ m, we have that: min{γi,t(s), t ∈ {1, ..., k}} = νi,k(s) ≤ wi,k(z) ≤
A. So we know that for every i ≥ m, there exists t(i) ∈ {1, ..., k} s.t. γi,t(i)(s) ≤ A.
Define now by induction i1 = m, i2 = i1 + t(i1),..., iq = iq−1 + t(iq−1), where
q is such that iq ≤ n < iq + t(iq). We have nγm,n(s) ≤
∑q−1
p=1 t(ip)A+ (n− iq)1 ≤
nA+ k − 1, so γm,n(s) ≤ A +
k−1
n
. 
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Lemma 3.5. For every state z in Z,
v+(z) ≤ inf
n≥1
sup
m≥0
wm,n(z) = inf
n≥1
sup
m≥0
vm,n(z).
Proof of lemma 3.5: Using lemma 3.4 with m = 0 and arbitrary positive k, we
can obtain lim supn vn(z) ≤ supl≥0wl,k(z). So v
+(z) ≤ infn≥1 supm≥0wm,n(z). We
always have wm,n(z) ≤ vm,n(z), so clearly infn≥1 supm≥0 wm,n(z) ≤ infn≥1 supm≥0 vm,n(z).
Finally, lemma 3.4 gives: ∀k ≥ 1, ∀n ≥ 1, ∀m ≥ 0, vm,nk(z) ≤ supl≥0wl,k(z) +
1
n
,
so supm vm,nk(z) ≤ supl≥0wl,k(z)+
1
n
. So infn supm vm,n(z) ≤ infn supm vm,nk(z) ≤
supl≥0wl,k(z), and this holds for every positive k. 
Definition 3.6. We define W = {wm,n, m ≥ 0, n ≥ 1}, and for each z in Z:
v∗(z) = inf
n≥1
sup
m≥0
wm,n(z) = inf
n≥1
sup
m≥0
vm,n(z).
W will always be endowed with the uniform distance d∞(w,w
′) = sup{|w(z)−
w(z′)|, z ∈ Z}, so W is a metric space. Due to lemma 3.3 and lemma 3.5, we
have the following chain of inequalities:
sup
m≥0
inf
n≥1
wm,n(z) ≤ sup
m≥0
inf
n≥1
vm,n(z) = v
−(z) ≤ v+(z) ≤ v∗(z). (2)
One may have supm≥0 infn≥1wm,n(z) < supm≥0 infn≥1 vm,n(z), as example 5.1 will
show later. Regarding the existence of the uniform value, the most general result
of this paper is the following (see the acknowledgements at the end).
Theorem 3.7. Let Z be a non empty set, F be a correspondence from Z to Z
with non empty values, and r be a mapping from Z to [0, 1].
Assume that W is precompact. Then for every initial state z in Z, the problem
Γ(z) = (Z, F, r, z) has a uniform value which is:
v∗(z) = v(z) = v+(z) = v−(z) = sup
m≥0
inf
n≥1
vm,n(z) = sup
m≥0
inf
n≥1
wm,n(z).
And the sequence (vn)n uniformly converges to v
∗.
If the state space Z is precompact and the family (wm,n)m≥0,n≥1 is uniformly
equicontinuous, then by Ascoli’s theorem we obtain that W is precompact. So a
corollary of theorem 3.7 is the following:
Corollary 3.8. Let Z be a non empty set, F be a correspondence from Z to Z
with non empty values, and r be a mapping from Z to [0, 1].
Assume that Z is endowed with a distance d such that: a) (Z, d) is a precom-
pact metric space, and b) the family (wm,n)m≥0,n≥1 is uniformly equicontinuous.
Then we have the same conclusions as theorem 3.7.
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Notice that if Z is finite, we can consider d such that d(z, z′) = 1 if z 6= z′,
so corollary 3.8 gives the well known result: in the finite case, the uniform value
exists. As the hypotheses of theorem 3.7 and corollary 3.8 depend on the auxiliary
functions (wm,n), we now present an existence result with hypotheses directly
expressed in terms of the basic data (Z, F, r).
Corollary 3.9. Let Z be a non empty set, F be a correspondence from Z to Z
with non empty values, and r be a mapping from Z to [0, 1].
Assume that Z is endowed with a distance d such that: a) (Z, d) is a precom-
pact metric space, b) r is uniformly continuous, and c) F is non expansive, i.e.
∀z ∈ Z, ∀z′ ∈ Z, ∀z1 ∈ F (z), ∃z
′
1 ∈ F (z
′) s.t. d(z1, z
′
1) ≤ d(z, z
′). Then we have
the same conclusions as theorem 3.7.
Suppose for example that F has compact values, and use the Hausdorff dis-
tance between compact subsets of Z: d(A,B) = Max{supa∈A d(a,B), supb∈B d(A, b)}.
Then F is non expansive if and only if it is 1-Lipschitz: d(F (z), F (z′)) ≤ d(z, z′)
for all (z, z′) in Z2.
Proof of corollary 3.9: Assume that a), b), and c) are satisfied.
Consider z and z′ in Z, and a play s = (zt)t≥1 in S(z). We have z1 ∈ F (z),
and F is non expansive, so there exists z′1 ∈ F (z
′) such that d(z1, z
′
1) ≤ d(z, z
′).
It is easy to construct inductively a play (z′t)t in S(z
′) such that for each t,
d(zt, z
′
t) ≤ d(z, z
′). Consequently:
∀(z, z′) ∈ Z2, ∀s = (zt)t≥1 ∈ S(z), ∃s
′ = (z′t)t≥1 ∈ S(z
′) s.t. ∀t ≥ 1, d(zt, z
′
t) ≤ d(z, z
′).
We now consider payoffs. Define the modulus of continuity εˆ of r by εˆ(α) =
supz,z′s.t.d(z ,z ′)≤α |r(z) − r(z
′)| for each α ≥ 0. So |r(z) − r(z′)| ≤ εˆ(d(z, z′))
for each pair of states z, z′, and εˆ is continuous at 0. Using the previous
construction, we obtain that for z and z′ in Z, ∀m ≥ 0, ∀n ≥ 1, |vm,n(z) −
vm,n(z
′)| ≤ εˆ(d(z, z′)) and |wm,n(z) − wm,n(z
′)| ≤ εˆ(d(z, z′)). In particular, the
family (wm,n)m≥0,n≥1 is uniformly continuous, and corollary 3.8 gives the result.

We now provide an existence result for the limit value.
Theorem 3.10. Let Z be a non empty set, F be a correspondence from Z to Z
with non empty values, and r be a mapping from Z to [0, 1].
Assume that the set V = {vn, n ≥ 1}, endowed with the uniform distance,
is a precompact metric space. Then for every initial state z in Z, the problem
Γ(z) = (Z, F, r, z) has a limit value which is:
v∗(z) = inf
n≥1
sup
m≥0
vm,n(z) = sup
m≥0
inf
n≥1
vm,n(z).
And the sequence (vn)n uniformly converges to v
∗.
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In particular, we obtain that the uniform convergence of (vn)n is equivalent
to the precompacity of V. And if (vn)n uniformly converges, then the limit has
to be v∗. Notice that this does not imply the existence of the uniform value, as
shown by the counter-examples in Monderer Sorin (1993) and Lehrer Monderer
(1994).
4 Proof of theorems 3.7 and 3.10
4.1 Proof of theorem 3.7
We assume that W is precompact, and prove here theorem 3.7. The proof is
made in five steps.
Step 1. Viewing Z as a precompact pseudometric space.
Define d(z, z′) = supm,n |wm,n(z) − wm,n(z
′)| for all z, z′ in Z. (Z, d) is a
pseudometric space (hence may not be Hausdorff). Fix ε > 0. By assumption on
W there exists a finite subset I of indexes such that: ∀m ≥ 0, ∀n ≥ 1, ∃i ∈ I s.t.
d∞(wm,n, wi) ≤ ε. Since {(wi(z))i∈I , z ∈ Z} is included in the compact metric
space ([0, 1]I , uniform distance), we obtain the existence of a finite subset C of
Z such that: ∀z ∈ Z, ∃c ∈ C s.t. ∀i ∈ I, |wi(z)− wi(c)| ≤ ε. We obtain:
For each ε > 0, there exists a finite subset C of Z s.t. : ∀z ∈ Z, ∃c ∈ C, d(z, c) ≤
ε.
Equivalently, every sequence in Z admits a Cauchy subsequence for d.
In the sequel of subsection 4.1, Z will always be endowed with the pseudo-
metric d. It is plain that every value function wm,n is now 1-Lipschitz. Since
v∗(z) = infn≥1 supm≥0 wm,n(z), the mapping v
∗ also is 1-Lipschitz.
Step 2. Iterating F .
We define inductively a sequence of correspondences (F n)n from Z to Z, by
F 0(z) = {z} for every state z, and ∀n ≥ 0, F n+1 = F n◦F (where the composition
is defined by G ◦H(z) = {z” ∈ Z, ∃z′ ∈ H(z), z” ∈ G(z′)}). F n(z) represents the
set of states that the decision maker can reach in n stages from the initial state
z. It is easily shown by induction on m that:
∀m ≥ 0, ∀n ≥ 1, ∀z ∈ Z, wm,n(z) = sup
y∈Fm(z)
wn(y). (3)
We also define, for every initial state z: Gm(z) =
⋃m
n=0 F
n(z) and G∞(z) =⋃∞
n=0 F
n(z). The set G∞(z) is the set of states that the decision maker, start-
ing from z, can reach in a finite number of stages. Since (Z, d) is precompact
pseudometric, we can obtain the convergence of Gm(z) to G∞(z):
∀ε > 0, ∀z ∈ Z, ∃m ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ G∞(z), ∃y ∈ Gm(z) s.t. d(x, y) ≤ ε. (4)
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(Suppose on the contrary that there exists ε, z, and a sequence (zm)m of points in
G∞(z) such that the distance d(zm, G
m(z)) is at least ε for each m. Then by con-
sidering a Cauchy subsequence (zϕ(m))m, one can findm0 such that for allm ≥ m0,
d(zϕ(m), zϕ(m0)) ≤ ε/2. Let now k be such that zϕ(m0) ∈ G
k(z), we have for every
m ≥ k: ε/2 ≥ d(zϕ(m), zϕ(m0)) ≥ d(zϕ(m), G
k(z)) ≥ d(zϕ(m), G
ϕ(m)(z)) ≥ ε. Hence
a contradiction.)
Step 3. Convergence of (vn(z))n to v
∗(z).
3.a. Here we will show that:
∀ε > 0, ∀z ∈ Z, ∃M ≥ 0, ∀n ≥ 1, ∃m ≤M s.t. wm,n(z) ≥ v
∗(z)− ε. (5)
Fix ε > 0 and z in Z. By (4) there exists M such that: ∀x ∈ G∞(z), ∃y ∈
GM(z) s.t. d(x, y) ≤ ε. For each positive n, by definition of v∗ there exists m(n)
such that wm(n),n(z) ≥ v
∗(z)− ε. So by equation (3), one can find yn in G
m(n)(z)
s.t. wn(yn) ≥ v
∗(z)− 2ε. By definition of M , there exists y′n in G
M(z) such that
d(yn, y
′
n) ≤ ε. And wn(y
′
n) ≥ wn(yn)− ε ≥ v
∗(z)− 3ε. This proves (5).
3.b. Fix ε > 0 and z in Z, and consider M ≥ 0 given by (5). Consider some m
in {0, ...,M} such that: wm,n(z) ≥ v
∗(z)− ε is true for infinitely many n’s. Since
wm,n+1 ≤ wm,n, the inequality wm,n(z) ≥ v
∗(z) − ε is true for every n. We have
improved step 3.a. and obtained:
∀ε > 0, ∀z ∈ Z, ∃m ≥ 0, ∀n ≥ 1, wm,n(z) ≥ v
∗(z)− ε. (6)
Consequently, ∀z ∈ Z, ∀ε > 0, supm infn wm,n(z) ≥ v
∗(z)− ε. So for every initial
state z, supm infn wm,n(z) ≥ v
∗(z), and inequalities (2) give:
sup
m
inf
n
wm,n(z) = sup
m
inf
n
vm,n(z) = v
−(z) = v+(z) = v∗(z).
And (vn(z))n converges to v
∗(z).
Step 4. Uniform convergence of (vn)n.
4.a. Write, for each state z and n ≥ 1: fn(z) = supm≥0wm,n(z). The sequence
(fn)n is non increasing and simply converges to v
∗. Each fn is 1-Lipschitz and Z
is pseudometric precompact, so the convergence is uniform. As a consequence we
get:
∀ε > 0, ∃n0, ∀z ∈ Z, sup
m≥0
wm,n0(z) ≤ v
∗(z) + ε.
By lemma 3.4, we obtain:
∀ε > 0, ∃n0, ∀z ∈ Z, ∀m ≥ 0, ∀n ≥ 1, vm,n(z) ≤ v
∗(z) + ε+
n0 − 1
n
.
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Considering n1 ≥ n0/ε gives:
∀ε > 0, ∃n1, ∀z ∈ Z, ∀n ≥ n1, vn(z) ≤ sup
m≥0
vm,n(z) ≤ v
∗(z) + 2ε (7)
4.b. Write now, for each state z and m ≥ 0: gm(z) = supm′≤m infn≥1wm′,n(z).
(gm)m is non decreasing and simply converges to v
∗. As in 4.a., we can obtain
that (gm)m uniformly converges. Consequently,
∀ε > 0, ∃M ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ Z, ∃m ≤M, inf
n≥1
wm,n(z) ≥ v
∗(z)− ε. (8)
Fix ε > 0, and consider M given above. Consider N ≥ M/ε. Then ∀z ∈ Z,
∀n ≥ N , ∃m ≤ M s.t. wm,n(z) ≥ v
∗(z) − ε. But vn(z) ≥ vm,n(z) −m/n by (1),
so we obtain vn(z) ≥ vm,n(z)− ε ≥ v
∗(z)− 2ε. We have shown:
∀ε > 0, ∃N, ∀z ∈ Z, ∀n ≥ N, vn(z) ≥ v
∗(z)− 2ε. (9)
By (7) and (9), the convergence of (vn)n is uniform.
Step 5. Uniform value.
By claim 2.4, in order to prove that Γ(z) has a uniform value it remains to
show that ε-optimal plays exist for every ε > 0. We start with a lemma.
Lemma 4.1. ∀ε > 0, ∃M ≥ 0, ∃K ≥ 1, ∀z ∈ Z, ∃m ≤ M, ∀n ≥ K, ∃s = (zt)t≥1 ∈
S(z) such that:
νm,n(s) ≥ v
∗(z)− ε/2, and v∗(zm+n) ≥ v
∗(z)− ε.
This lemma has the same flavor as Proposition 2 in Rosenberg et al. (2002),
and Proposition 2 in Lehrer Sorin (1992). If we want to construct ε- optimal
plays, for every large n we have to construct a play which: 1) gives good av-
erage payoffs if one stops the play at any large stage before n, and 2) after n
stages, leaves the player with a good “target” payoff. This explains the impor-
tance of the quantities νm,n which have led to the definition of the mappings wm,n.
Proof of lemma 4.1: Fix ε > 0. Take M given by property (8). Take K given
by (7) such that: ∀z ∈ Z, ∀n ≥ K, vn(z) ≤ supm vm,n(z) ≤ v
∗(z) + ε.
Fix an initial state z in Z. Consider m given by (8), and n ≥ K. We have to
find s = (zt)t≥1 ∈ S(z) such that: νm,n(s) ≥ v
∗(z)−ε/2, and v∗(zm+n) ≥ v
∗(z)−ε.
We have wm,n′(z) ≥ v
∗(z) − ε for every n′ ≥ 1, so wm,2n(z) ≥ v
∗(z) − ε, and
we consider s = (z1, ..., zt, ...) ∈ S(z) which is ε-optimal for wm,2n(z), in the sense
that νm,2n(s) ≥ wm,2n(z)− ε. We have:
νm,n(s) ≥ νm,2n(s) ≥ wm,2n(z)− ε ≥ v
∗(z)− 2ε.
Write: X = γm,n(s) and Y = γm+n,n(s).
s z1 zm zm+1 zm+n zm+n+1 zm+2n
X Y
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Since νm,2n(s) ≥ v
∗(z)−2ε, we have X ≥ v∗(z)−2ε, and (X+Y )/2 = γm,2n(s) ≥
v∗(z)− 2ε. Since n ≥ K, we also have X ≤ vm,n(z) ≤ v
∗(z) + ε. And n ≥ K also
gives vn(zm+n) ≤ v
∗(zm+n) + ε, so v
∗(zm+n) ≥ vn(zm+n) − ε ≥ Y − ε. We write
now Y/2 = (X+Y )/2−X/2 and obtain Y/2 ≥ (v∗(z)−5ε)/2. So Y ≥ v∗(z)−5ε,
and finally v∗(zm+n) ≥ v
∗(z)− 6ε. 
Proposition 4.2. For every state z and ε > 0 there exists an ε-optimal play in
Γ(z).
Proof: Fix α > 0.
For every i ≥ 1, set εi =
α
2i
. Define Mi = M(εi) and Ki = K(εi) given by
lemma 4.1 for εi. Define also ni as the integer part of 1+Max{Ki,
Mi+1
α
}, so that
simply ni ≥ Ki and ni ≥
Mi+1
α
.
We have: ∀i ≥ 1, ∀z ∈ Z, ∃m(z, i) ≤Mi, ∃s = (zt)t≥1 ∈ S(z), s.t.
νm(z,i),ni(s) ≥ v
∗(z)−
α
2i+1
and v∗(zm(z,i)+ni) ≥ v
∗(z)−
α
2i
.
We now fix the initial state z in Z, and for simplicity write v∗ for v∗(z). If
α ≥ v∗ it is clear that α-optimal plays at Γ(z) exist, so we assume v∗ − α > 0.
We define a sequence (zi, mi, s
i)i≥1 by induction:
• first put z1 = z, m1 = m(z
1, 1) ≤ M1, and pick s
1 = (z1t )t≥1 in S(z
1) such
that νm1,n1(s
1) ≥ v∗(z1)− α
22
, and v∗(z1m1+n1) ≥ v
∗(z1)− α
2
.
• for i ≥ 2, put zi = zi−1mi−1+ni−1 , mi = m(z
i, i) ≤ Mi, and pick s
i = (zit)t≥1 ∈
S(zi) such that νmi,ni(s
i) ≥ v∗(zi)− α
2i+1
and v∗(zimi+ni) ≥ v
∗(zi)− α
2i
.
Consider finally s = (z11 , ..., z
1
m1+n1
, z21 , ..., z
2
m2+n2
, ...., zi1, ..., z
i
mi+ni
, zi+11 , ...). s
is a play at z, and is defined by blocks: first s1 is followed for m1 + n1 stages,
then s2 is followed for m2 + n2 stages, etc... Since z
i = zi−1mi−1+ni−1 for each i, s is
a play at z. For each i we have ni ≥ Mi+1/α ≥ mi+1/α, so the “ni subblock” is
much longer than the “mi+1 subblock”.
. . .s
s1 si
m1 stages n1 stages mi stages ni stages
For each i ≥ 1, we have v∗(zi) ≥ v∗(zi−1)− α
2i−1
. So v∗(zi) ≥ − α
2i−1
− α
2i−2
...−
α
2
+ v∗(z1) ≥ v∗ − α + α
2i
. So νmi,ni(s
i) ≥ v∗ − α.
Let now T be large.
First assume that T = m1+n1+ ...+mi−1+ni−1+ r, for some positive i and
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r in {0, ..., mi}. We have:
γT (s) =
T −m1
T
1
T −m1
T∑
t=1
g(st)
≥
T −m1
T
1
T −m1
T∑
t=m1+1
g(st)
≥
T −m1
T
1
T −m1
(
i−1∑
j=1
nj
)
(v∗ − α)
But T −m1 ≤ n1 +m2 + ... + ni−1 +mi ≤ (1 + α)
(∑i−1
j=1 nj
)
, so
γT (s) ≥
T −m1
T (1 + α)
(v∗ − α).
And the right hand-side converges to (v∗ − α)/(1 + α) as T goes to infinity.
Assume now that T = m1+n1+ ...+mi−1+ni−1+mi+ r, for some positive i
and r in {0, ..., ni}. The previous computation shows that:
∑m1+n1+...+mi
t=1 g(st) ≥
n1+...+mi
(1+α)
(v∗−α). Since νmi,ni(s
i) ≥ v∗−α, we also have
∑T
t=m1+n1+...+mi+1
g(st) ≥
r(v∗ − α). Consequently:
TγT (s) ≥ (T −m1 − r)
v∗ − α
1 + α
+ r(v∗ − α),
≥ T
v∗ − α
1 + α
−m1
v∗ − α
1 + α
+ r
α(v∗ − α)
1 + α
,
γT (s) ≥
v∗ − α
1 + α
−
m1
T
(v∗ − α)
1 + α
.
So we obtain lim infT γT (s) ≥ (v
∗ − α)/(1 + α) = v∗ − α
1+α
(1 + v∗). We have
proved the existence of a α(1+ v∗) optimal play in Γ(z) for every positive α, and
this concludes the proofs of proposition 4.2 and consequently, of theorem 3.7. 
Remark 4.3. It is possible to see that properties (7) and (8) imply the uniform
convergence of (vn) to v
∗(z) = supm infnwm,n(z) = supm infn vm,n(z), and step 5
of the proof. So assuming in theorem 3.7 that (7) and (8) hold, instead of the
precompacity of W , still yields all the conclusions of the theorem.
Remark 4.4. The hypothesis “W precompact” is quite strong and is not satisfied
in the following example, which deals with Cesaro convergence of bounded real
sequences. Take Z as the set of positive integers, the transition F simply is
F (n) = {n + 1} (hence the system is uncontrolled here). The payoff function
in state n is given by un, where (un)n is the sequence of 0 and 1’s defined by
consecutive blocks: B1, B2,..., Bk,..., where Bk has length 2k and consists of
k consecutive 1’s then k consecutive 0’s. The sequence (un)n Cesaro-converges
to 1/2, hence this is the limit value and the uniform value. We have 1/2 =
supm infn vm,n, but v
∗ = infn supm vm,n = 1, and W is not precompact here.
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4.2 Proof of theorem 3.10
We start with a lemma, which requires no assumption.
Lemma 4.5. For every state z in Z, and m0 ≥ 0,
inf
n≥1
sup
0≤m≤m0
vm,n(z) ≤ v
−(z) ≤ v+(z) ≤ inf
n≥1
sup
m≥0
vm,n(z).
Proof : Because of lemma 3.5, we just have to prove here that infn≥1 supm≤m0 vm,n(z)
≤ v−(z). Assume for contradiction that there exist z in Z, m0 ≥ 0 and ε > 0
such that: ∀n ≥ 1, ∃m ≤ m0, vm,n(z) ≥ v
−(z) + ε. Then for each n ≥ 1, we have
(m0 + n)vm0+n(z) ≥ n(v
−(z) + ε), which gives vm0+n(z) ≥
n
m0+n
(v−(z) + ε). This
is a contradiction with the definition of v−. 
We now assume that V is precompact, and will prove theorem 3.10. The
proof is made in three elementary steps, the first two being similar to the proof
of theorem 3.7.
Step 1. Viewing Z as a precompact pseudometric space.
Define d(z, z′) = supn≥1 |vn(z) − vn(z
′)| for all z, z′ in Z. As in step 1 of the
proof of theorem 3.7, we can use the assumption “V precompact” to prove the
precompacity of the pseudometric space (Z, d). We obtain:
For all ε > 0, there exists a finite subset C of Z s.t. : ∀z ∈ Z, ∃c ∈ C, d(z, c) ≤ ε.
In the sequel of subsection 4.2, Z will always be endowed with the pseudometric
d. It is plain that every value function vn is now 1-Lipschitz.
Step 2. Iterating F .
We proceed as in step 2 of the proof of theorem 3.7, and define inductively
the sequence of correspondences (F n)n from Z to Z, by F
0(z) = {z} for every
state z, and ∀n ≥ 0, F n+1 = F n ◦ F . F n(z) represents the set of states that the
decision maker can reach in n stages from the initial state z. We easily have:
∀m ≥ 0, ∀n ≥ 1, ∀z ∈ Z, vm,n(z) = sup
z′∈Fm(z)
vn(z
′). (10)
We also define, for every initial state z: Gm(z) =
⋃m
n=0 F
n(z) and G∞(z) =⋃∞
n=0 F
n(z). The set G∞(z) is the set of states that the decision maker, starting
from z, can reach in a finite number of stages. And since (Z, d) is precompact
pseudometric, we obtain the convergence of Gm(z) to G∞(z):
∀ε > 0, ∀z ∈ Z, ∃m ≥ 0, ∀z′ ∈ G∞(z), ∃z′′ ∈ Gm(z) s.t. d(z′, z′′) ≤ ε. (11)
Step 3. Convergence of (vn)n. Fix an initial state z. Because of (10), the
inequalities of lemma 4.5 give: for each m0 ≥ 0,
inf
n≥1
sup
z′∈Gm0 (z)
vn(z
′) ≤ v−(z) ≤ v+(z) ≤ inf
n≥1
sup
z′∈G∞(z)
vn(z
′) = v∗(z).
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To prove the convergence of (vn(z))n to v
∗(z), it is thus enough to show that:
∀ǫ > 0, ∃m0 s.t. infn≥1 supz′∈Gm0 (z) vn(z
′) ≥ infn≥1 supz′∈G∞(z) vn(z
′) − ε. We
will simply use the convergence of (Gm(z))m to G
∞(z), and the equicontinuity of
the family (vn)n.
Fix ε > 0. By (11), one can find m0 such that ∀z
′ ∈ G∞(z), ∃z′′ ∈ Gm0(z)
s.t. d(z′, z′′) ≤ ε. Fix n ≥ 1, and consider z′ ∈ G∞(z) such that vn(z
′) ≥
supy∈G∞(z) vn(y) − ε. There exists z
′′ in Gm0(z) s.t. d(z′, z′′) ≤ ε. Since vn is
1-Lipschitz, we have vn(z
′′) ≥ supy∈G∞(z) vn(y)− 2ε, hence supy∈Gm0 (z) vn(y) ≥
supy∈G∞(z) vn(y)− 2ε. Since this is true for every n, it concludes the proof of the
convergence of (vn(z))n to v
∗(z).
Each vn is 1-Lipschitz and Z is precompact, hence the convergence of (vn)n
to v∗ is uniform. This concludes the proof of theorem 3.10. 
5 Comments
We start with an example.
Example 5.1.
This example may be seen as an adaptation to the compact setup of an exam-
ple of Lehrer and Sorin (1992), and illustrates the importance of condition c) (F
non expansive) in the hypotheses of corollary 3.9. It also shows that in general
one may have: supm≥0 infn≥1wm,n(z) 6= supm≥0 infn≥1 vm,n(z).
Define the set of states Z as the unit square [0, 1]2 plus some isolated point
z0. The transition is given by F (z0) = {(0, y), y ∈ [0, 1]}, and for (x, y) in [0, 1]
2,
F (x, y) = {(Min{1, x+y}, y)}. The initial state being z0, the interpretation is the
following. The decision maker only has one decision to make, he has to choose
at the first stage a point (0, y), with y ∈ [0, 1]. Then the play is determined,
and the state evolves horizontally (the second coordinate remains y forever) with
arithmetic progression until it reaches the line x = 1. y also represents the speed
chosen by the decision maker: if y = 0, then the state will remain (0, 0) forever.
If y > 0, the state will evolve horizontally with speed y until reaching the point
(1, y).
∗z0
 
 
 
 
 
 
−y
0 1
3
2
3
1
1
Let now the reward function r be such that for every (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2, r(x, y) = 1
if x ∈ [1/3, 2/3], and r(x, y) = 0 if x /∈ [1/4, 3/4]. The payoff is low when x takes
extreme values, so intuitively the decision maker would like to maximize the
number of stages where the first coordinate of the state is “not too far” from 1/2.
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Endow for example [0, 1]2 with the distance d induced by the norm ‖.‖1 of
IR2, and set d(z0, (x, y)) = 1 for every x and y in [0, 1]. (Z, d) is a compact metric
space, and r can be extended as a Lipschitz function on Z. One can check that
F is 2-Lipschitz, i.e. we have d(F (z), F (z′)) ≤ 2d(z, z′) for each z, z′.
For each n ≥ 2, we have vn(z0) ≥ 1/2 because the decision maker can reach
the line x = 2/3 in exactly n stages by choosing initially (0, 2
3(n−1)
). But for
each play s at z0, we have limnγn(s) = 0, so v(z0) = 0. The uniform value does
not exist for Γ(z0). This shows the importance of condition c) of corollary 3.9:
although F is very smooth, it is not non expansive. As a byproduct, we obtain
that there is no distance on Z compatible with the Euclidean topology which
makes the correspondence F non expansive.
We now show that supm≥0 infn≥1wm,n(z0) < supm≥0 infn≥1 vm,n(z0). We have
supm≥0 infn≥1 vm,n(z0) = v
−(z0) ≥ 1/2. Fix now m ≥ 0, and ε > 0. Take n larger
than 3m
ε
, and consider a play s = (zt)t≥1 in S(z0) such that νm,n(s) > 0. By defi-
nition of νm,n, we have γm,1(s) > 0, so the first coordinate of zm+1 is in [1/4, 3/4].
If we denote by y the second coordinate of z1, the first coordinate of zm+1 is my,
so my ≥ 1/4. But this implies that 4my ≥ 1, so at any stage greater than 4m
the payoff is zero. Consequently nγm,n(s) ≤ 3m, and γm,n(s) ≤ ε. νm,n(s) ≤ ε,
and this holds for any play s. So supm≥0 infn≥1wm,n(z0) = 0.
Example 5.2. 0-optimal strategies may not exist.
The following example shows that 0-optimal strategies may not exist, even
when the assumptions of corollary 3.9 hold, Z is compact and F has compact
values. It is the deterministic adaptation of example 1.4.4. in Sorin (2002).
Define Z as the simplex {z = (pa, pb, pc) ∈ IR3+, p
a + pb + pc = 1}. The payoff
is r(pa, pb, pc) = pb − pc, and the transition is defined by: F (pa, pb, pc) = {((1 −
α − α2)pa, pb + αpa, pc + α2pa), α ∈ [0, 1/2]}. The initial state is z0 = (1, 0, 0).
Notice that along any path, the second coordinate and the third coordinate are
non decreasing.
The probabilistic interpretation is the following: there are 3 points a, b and
c, and the initial point is a. The payoff is 0 at a, it is +1 at b, and -1 at c. At
point a, the decision maker has to choose α ∈ [0, 1/2]: then b is reached with
probability α, c is reached with probability α2, and the play stays in a with the
remaining probability 1−α−α2. When b (resp. c) is reached, the play stays at b
(resp. c) forever. So the decision maker starting at point a wants to reach b and
to avoid c.
Back to our deterministic setup, we use norm ‖.‖1 and obtain that Z is com-
pact, F is non expansive and r is continuous. Applying corollary 3.9 gives the
existence of the uniform value.
Fix ε in (0, 1/2). The decision maker can choose at each stage the same
probability ε, i.e. he can choose at each state zt = (p
a
t , p
b
t , p
c
t) the next zt+1 as
((1− ε− ε2)pa, pb+ εpa, pc+ ε2pa). This sequence of states s = (zt)t converges to
15
(0, 1
1+ε
, ε
1+ε
). So lim inft γt(s) =
1−ε
1+ε
. Finally we obtain that the uniform value at
z0 is 1.
But as soon as the decision maker chooses a positive α at point a, he has a
positive probability to be stuck forever with a payoff of -1, so it is clear that no
0-optimal strategy exist here.
Remark 5.3. On stationary ε-optimal plays.
A play s = (zt)t≥1 in S is said to be stationary at z0 if there exists a mapping
f from Z to Z such that for every positive t, zt = f(zt−1). We give here a positive
and a negative result.
A) When the uniform value exists, ε-optimal play can always be chosen stationary.
We just assume that Γ(z) has a uniform value, and proceed here as in the
proof of theorem 2 in Rosenberg et al., 2002. Fix the initial state z. Consider
ε > 0, a play s = (zt)t≥1 in S(z), and T0 such that ∀T ≥ T0, γT (s) ≥ v(z)− ε.
Case 1: Assume that there exist t1 and t2 such that zt1 = zt2 and the average
payoff between t1 and t2 is good in the sense that: γt1,t2(s) ≥ v(z) − 2ε. It is
then possible to repeat the cycle between t1 and t2 and obtain the existence of a
stationary (“cyclic”) 2ε-optimal play in Γ(z).
Case 2: Assume that there exists z′ in Z such that {t ≥ 0, zt = z
′} is infinite:
the play goes through z′ infinitely often. Then necessarily case 1 holds.
Case 3: Assume finally that case 1 does not hold. For every state z′, the play
s goes through z′ a finite number of times, and the average payoff between two
stages when z′ occurs (whenever these stages exist) is low.
We “shorten” s as much as possible. Set: y0 = z0, i1 = max{t ≥ 0, zt = z0},
y1 = zi1+1, i2 = max{t ≥ 0, zt = y1}, and by induction for each k, yk = zik+1 and
ik+1 = max{t ≥ 0, zt = yk}, so that zik+1 = yk = zik+1. The play s
′ = (yt)t≥0 can
be played at z. Since all yt are distinct, it is a stationary play at z. Regarding
payoffs, going from s to s′ we removed average payoffs of the type γt1,t2(s), where
zt1 = zt2 . Since we are not in case 1, each of these payoffs is less than v(z)− 2ε,
so going from s to s′ we increased the average payoffs and we have: ∀T ≥ T0,
γT (s
′) ≥ v(z)−ε. s′ is an ε-optimal play at z, and this concludes the proof of A).
Notice that we did not obtain the existence of a mapping f from Z to Z
such that for every initial state z, the play (f t(z))t≥1 (where f
t is f iterated t
times) is ε-optimal at z. In our proof, the mapping f depends on the initial state.
B) Continuous stationary strategies which are ε-optimal for each initial state may
not exist.
Assume that the hypotheses of corollary 3.9 are satisfied. Assume also that
Z is a subset of a Banach space and F has closed and convex values, so that F
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admits a continuous selection (by Michael’s theorem). The uniform value exists,
and by A) we know that ε-optimal plays can be chosen to be stationary. So if we
fix an initial state z, we can find a mapping f from Z to Z such that the play
(f t(z))t≥1 is ε-optimal at z. Can f be chosen as a continuous selection of Γ ?
A stronger result would be the existence of a continuous f such that for every
initial state z, the play (f t(z))t≥1 is ε-optimal at z. However this existence is not
guaranteed, as the following example shows. Define Z = [−1, 1] ∪ [2, 3], with the
usual distance. Set F (z) = [2, z + 3] if z ∈ [−1, 0], F (z) = [z + 2, 3] if z ∈ [0, 1],
and F (z) = {z} if z ∈ [2, 3]. Consider the payoff r(z) = |z − 5/2| for each z.
-
6
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 
 
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The hypotheses of corollary 3.9 are satisfied. The states in [2, 3] correspond to
final (“absorbing” states), and v(z) = |z−5/2| if z ∈ [2, 3]. If the initial state z is
in [−1, 1], one can always choose the final state to be 2 or 3, so that v(z) = 1/2.
Take now any continuous selection f of Γ. Necessarily f(−1) = 2 and f(1) = 3,
so there exists z in (−1, 1) such that f(z) = 5/2. But then the play s = (f t(z))t≥1
gives a null payoff at every stage, and for ε ∈ (0, 1/2) is not ε-optimal at z.
Remark 2.6, continued. Discounted payoffs, proofs.
We prove here the results announced in remark 2.6 about discounted payoffs.
Proceeding similarly as in definition 2.3 and claim 2.4, we say that Γ(z) has a
d-uniform value if: (vλ(z))λ has a limit v(z) when λ goes to zero, and for every
ε > 0, there exists a play s at z such that lim infλ→0 γλ(s) ≥ v(z)−ε.Whereas the
definition of uniform value fits Cesaro summations, the definition of d-uniform
value fits Abel summations.
Given a sequence (at)t≥1 of nonnegative real numbers, we denote for each
n ≥ 1 and λ ∈ (0, 1], by a¯n the Cesaro mean
1
n
∑n
t=1 at, and by a¯λ the Abel mean∑∞
t=1 λ(1 − λ)
t−1at. We have the following Abelian theorem (see e.g. Lippman
1969, or Sznajder and Filar, 1992):
lim sup
n→∞
a¯n ≥ lim sup
λ→0
a¯λ ≥ lim inf
λ→0
a¯λ ≥ lim inf
n→∞
a¯n.
And the convergence of a¯λ, as λ goes to zero, implies the convergence of a¯n, as
n goes to infinity, to the same limit (Hardy and Littlewood Theorem, see e.g.
Lippman 1969).
Lemma 5.4. If Γ(z) has a uniform value v(z), then Γ(z) has a d-uniform value
which is also v(z).
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Proof: Assume that Γ(z) has a uniform value v(z). Then for every ε > 0, there
exists a play s at z such that lim infλ→0 γλ(s) ≥ lim infn→∞ γn(s) ≥ v(z) − ε. So
lim infλ→0 vλ(z) ≥ v(z). But one always has lim supn vn(z) ≥ lim supλ vλ(z)(Lehrer
Sorin 1992). So vλ(z) −→λ→0 v(z), and there is a d-uniform value. 
We now give a counter-example to the converse of lemma 5.4. Liggett and
Lippman, 1969, showed how to construct a sequence (at)t≥1 with values in {0, 1}
such that a∗ := lim supλ→0 a¯λ < lim supn→∞ a¯n. Let
1 us define Z = IN and z0 = 0.
The transition satisfies: F (0) = {0, 1}, and F (t) = {t+ 1} is a singleton for each
positive t. The reward function is defined par r(0) = a∗, and for each t ≥ 1,
r(t) = at. A play in S(z0) can be identified with the number of positive stages
spent in state 0: there is the play s(∞) which always remains in state 0, and
for each k ≥ 0 the play s(k) = (st(k))t≥1 which leaves state 0 after stage k, i.e.
st(k) = 0 for t ≤ k, and st(k) = t− k otherwise.
For every λ in (0, 1], γλ(s(∞)) = a
∗, γλ(s(0)) = a¯λ, and for each k, γλ(s(k)) is
a convex combination between γλ(s(∞)) and γλ(s(0)), so vλ(z0) = max{a
∗, a¯λ}.
So vλ(z0) converges to a
∗ as λ goes to zero. Since s(∞) guarantees a∗ in every
game, Γ(z0) has a d-uniform value.
For each n ≥ 1, vn(z0) ≥ γn(s(0)) = a¯n, so lim supn vn(z0) ≥ lim supn→∞ a¯n.
But for every play s at z0, lim infn γn(s) ≤ max{a
∗, lim infn a¯n} = a
∗. The
decision maker can guarantee nothing more than a∗, so he can not guarantee
lim supn vn(z0), and Γ(z0) has no uniform value.
6 Applications to Markov decision processes
We start with a simple case.
6.1 MDPs with a finite set of states.
Consider a finite set of states K, with an initial probability p0 on K, a non empty
set of actions A, a transition function q fromK×A to the set ∆(K) of probability
distributions on K, and a reward function g from K × A to [0, 1].
This MDP is played as follows. An initial state k1 inK is selected according to
p0 and told to the decision maker, then he selects a1 in A and receives a payoff of
g(k1, a1). A new state k2 is selected according to q(k1, a1) and told to the decision
maker, etc... A strategy of the decision maker is then a sequence σ = (σt)t≥1,
where for each t, σt : (K × A)
t−1 ×K −→ A defines the action to be played at
stage t. Considering expected average payoffs in the first n stages, the definition
of the n-stage value vn(p0) naturally adapts to this case. And the notions of limit
value and uniform value also adapt here. Write Ψ(p0) for this MDP.
1We proceed similarly as in Flynn (1974), who showed that a Blackwell optimal play need
not be optimal with respect to “Derman’s average cost criterion”.
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We define an auxiliary (deterministic) dynamic programming problem Γ(z0).
We view ∆(K) as the set of vectors p = (pk)k in IR
K
+ such that
∑
k p
k = 1. We
introduce:
• a new set of states Z = ∆(K)× [0, 1],
• a new initial state z0 = (p0, 0),
• a new payoff function r : Z −→ [0, 1] such that r(p, y) = y for all
(p, y) in Z,
• a transition correspondence F from Z to Z such that for every
z = (p, y) in Z,
F (z) =
{(∑
k∈K
pkq(k, ak),
∑
k∈K
pkg(k, ak)
)
, ak ∈ A ∀k ∈ K
}
.
Notice that F ((p, y)) does not depend on y, hence the value functions in Γ(z)
only depend on the first component of z. It is easy to see that the value functions
of Γ and Ψ are linked as follows: ∀z = (p, y) ∈ Z, ∀n ≥ 1, vn(z) = vn(p).
Moreover, anything that can be guaranteed by the decision maker in Γ(p, 0) can
also be guaranteed in Ψ(p). So if we prove that the auxiliary problem Γ(p0, 0)
has a uniform value, then (vn(p0))n has a limit that can be guaranteed, up to
every ε > 0, in Γ(p0, 0), hence also in Ψ(p0). And we obtain the existence of the
uniform value for Ψ(p0).
It is convenient to set d((p, y), (p′, y′)) = max{‖p−p′‖1, |y−y
′|}. Z is compact
and r is continuous. F may have non compact values, but is non expansive so
that we can apply corollary 3.9. Consequently, for each p0, Ψ(p0) has a uniform
value, and we have obtained the following result.
Theorem 6.1. Any MDP with finite set of states has a uniform value.
We could not find theorem 6.1 in the literature. The case where A is finite is
well known since the seminal work of Blackwell (1962), who showed the existence
of Blackwell optimal plays. If A is compact and both q and g are continuous in
a, the uniform value was known to exist (see Dynkin Yushkevich, 1979, or Sorin,
2002, Corollary 5.26). In this case, more properties on (ε)-optimal strategies have
been obtained.
6.2 MDPs with partial observation.
We now consider a more general model where after each stage, the decision maker
does not perfectly observe the state. We still have a finite set of states K, an
initial probability p0 on K, a non empty set of actions A, but we also have a non
empty set of signals S. The transition q now goes from K×A to ∆f (S×K), the
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set of probabilities with finite support on S ×K, and the reward function g still
goes from K ×A to [0, 1].
This MDP Ψ(p0) is played by a decision maker knowing K, p0, A, S, q and g
and the following description. An initial state k1 in K is selected according to p0
and is not told to the decision maker. At every stage t the decision maker selects
an action at ∈ A, and has a (unobserved) payoff g(kt, at). Then a pair (st, kt+1)
is selected according to q(kt, at), and st is told to the decision maker. The new
state is kt+1, and the play goes to stage t+ 1.
The existence of the uniform value was proved in Rosenberg et al. in the
case where A and S are finite sets2. We show here how to apply corollary 3.8 to
this setup, and generalize the mentioned result of Rosenberg et al. to the case of
arbitrary sets of actions and signals.
A pure strategy of the decision maker is then a sequence σ = (σt)t≥1, where
for each t, σt : (A× S)
t−1 −→ A defines the action to be played at stage t. More
general strategies are behavioral strategies, which are sequences σ = (σt)t≥1,
where for each t, σt : (A× S)
t−1 −→ ∆f (A) and ∆f (A) is the set of probabilities
with finite support on A. In Ψ(p0) we assume that players use behavior strategies.
Any strategy induces, together with p0, a probability distribution over (K ×A×
S)∞, and we can define expected average payoffs and n-stage values vn(p0). These
n-stage values can be obtained with pure strategies. However, one has to be
careful when dealing with an infinite number of stages: in general it may not be
true that something which can be guaranteed by the decision maker in Ψ(p0),
i.e.. with behavior strategies, can also be guaranteed by the decision maker with
pure strategies. We will prove here the existence of the uniform value in Ψ(p0),
and thus obtain:
Theorem 6.2. If the set of states is finite, a MDP with partial observation,
played with behavioral strategies, has a uniform value.
Proof: As in the previous model, we view ∆(K) as the set of vectors p = (pk)k in
IRK+ such that
∑
k p
k = 1. We write X = ∆(K), and use ‖.‖1 on X. Assume that
the state of some stage has been selected according to p in X and the decision
maker plays some action a in A. This defines a probability on the future belief of
the decision maker on the state of the next stage. It is a probability with finite
support because we have a belief in X for each possible signal S, and we denote
this probability on X by qˆ(p, a). To introduce a deterministic problem we need
a larger space than X.
We define ∆(X) as the set of Borel probabilities overX, and endow ∆(X) with
the weak-* topology. ∆(X) is now compact and the set ∆f (X) of probabilities
on X with finite support is a dense subset of ∆(X). Moreover, the topology on
2These authors also considered the case of a compact action set, with some continuity on g
and q, see comment 5 p. 1192.
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∆(X) can be metrized by the (Fortet-Mourier-)Wasserstein distance, defined by:
∀u ∈ ∆(X), ∀v ∈ ∆(X), d(u, v) = sup
f∈E1
|u(f)− v(f)|,
where: E1 is the set of 1-Lipschitz functions fromX to IR, and u(f) =
∫
p∈X
f(p)du(p).
One can check that this distance also has the nice following properties:3
1) for p and q in X, the distance between the Dirac measures δp and δq is
‖p− q‖1.
2) For every continuous mapping from X to the reals, let us denote by f˜ the
affine extension of f to ∆(X). We have f˜(u) = u(f) for each u. Then for each
C ≥ 0, we obtain the equivalence: f is C-Lipschitz if and only if f˜ is C-Lipschitz.
We will need to consider a whole class of value functions. Let θ =
∑
t≥1 θtδt
be in ∆f (IN
∗), i.e. θ is a probability with finite support over positive inte-
gers. For p in X and any behavior strategy σ, we define the payoff: γp[θ](σ) =
IEIPp,σ (
∑∞
t=1 θt g(kt, at)), and the value: v[θ](p) = supσ γ
p
[θ](σ). If θ = 1/n
∑n
t=1 δt,
v[θ](p) is nothing but vn(p). v[θ] is a 1-Lipschitz function so its affine extension
v˜[θ] also is. A standard recursive formula can be written: if we write θ
+ for the
law of t∗ − 1 given that t∗ (selected according to θ) is greater than 1, we get for
each θ and p: v[θ](p) = supa∈A
(
θ1
∑
k p
kg(k, a) + (1− θ1)v˜[θ+](qˆ(p, a))
)
.
We now define a deterministic problem Γ(z0). An element u in ∆f(X) is
written u =
∑
p∈X u(p)δp, and similarly an element v in ∆f(A) is written v =∑
a∈A v(a)δa. Notice that if p 6= q, then 1/2 δp+1/2 δq is different from δ1/2 p+1/2 q.
We introduce:
• a new set of states Z = ∆f(X)× [0, 1],
• a new initial state z0 = (δp0 , 0),
• a new payoff function r : Z −→ [0, 1] such that r(u, y) = y for all
(u, y) in Z,
• a transition correspondence F from Z to Z such that for every
z = (u, y) in Z:
F (z) = {(H(u, f), R(u, f)) , f : X −→ ∆f(A)} ,
where H(u, f) =
∑
p∈X u(p)
(∑
a∈A f(p)(a)qˆ(p, a)
)
∈ ∆f (X),
and R(u, f) =
∑
p∈X u(p)
(∑
k∈K,a∈A p
kf(p)(a)g(k, a)
)
.
Γ(z0) is a well defined dynamic programming problem. F (u, y) does not de-
pend on y, so the value functions in Γ(z) only depend on the first coordinate
3Notice that if d(k, k′) = 2 for any distinct states in K, then supf :K→IR,1−Lip |
∑
k p
kf(k)−∑
k q
kf(k)| = ‖p− q‖1 for every p and q in ∆(K).
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of z. For every θ =
∑
t≥1 θtδt in ∆f(IN
∗) and play s = (zt)t≥1, we define
the payoff γ[θ](s) =
∑∞
t=1 θtr(zt), and the value : v[θ](z) = sups∈S(z) γ[θ](s).
If θ = 1/n
∑n
t=m+1 δt, γ[θ](s) is nothing but γm,n(s), and v[θ](z) is nothing
but vm,n(z), see definitions 3.1 and 3.2. γ[t](s) is just the payoff of stage t,
i.e. r(zt). The recursive formula now is: v[θ]((u, y)) = supf :X−→∆f (A)(θ1R(u, f)
+(1 − θ1)v[θ+](H(u, f), 0)), and the supremum can be taken on deterministic
mappings f : X −→ A. Consequently, the value functions are linked as follows:
∀z = (u, y) ∈ Z, v[θ](z) = v˜[θ](u). Moreover, anything which can be guaranteed by
the decision maker in Γ(z0) can be guaranteed in the original MDP Ψ(p0). So the
existence of the uniform value in Γ(z0) will imply the existence of the uniform
value in Ψ(p0).
We set d((u, y), (u′, y′)) = max{d(u, u′), |y − y′|}. Since ∆f(X) is dense in
∆(X) for the Wasserstein distance, Z is a precompact metric space. By corollary
3.8, if we show that the family (wm,n)m≥0,n≥1 is uniformly equicontinuous, we will
be done. Notice already that since v˜[θ] is a 1-Lipschitz function of u, v[θ] is a
1-Lipschitz function of z.
Fix now z in Z, m ≥ 0 and n ≥ 1. We define an auxiliary zero-sum game
A(m,n, z) as follows: player 1’s strategy set is S(z), player 2’s strategy set is
∆({1, ..., n}), and the payoff for player 1 is given by: l(s, θ) =
∑n
t=1 θtγm,t(s). We
will apply a minmax theorem to A(m,n, z), in order to obtain: sups infθ l(s, θ) =
infθ sups l(s, θ). We can already notice that sups infθ l(s, θ) = sups∈S(z) inft∈{1,...,n}
γm,t(s) = wm,n(z). ∆({1, ..., n}) is convex compact and l is affine continuous in
θ. We will show that S(z) is a convex subset of Z, and first prove that F is an
affine correspondence.
Lemma 6.3. For every z′ and z′′ in Z, and λ ∈ [0, 1], F (λz′ + (1 − λ)z′′) =
λF (z′) + (1− λ)F (z′′).
Proof: Write z′ = (u′, y′), z′′ = (u′′, y′′) and z = (u, y) = λz′+(1−λ)z′′. We have
u(p) = λu′(p)+(1−λ)u′′(p) for each p. It is easy to see that F (z) ⊂ λF (z′)+(1−
λ)F (z′′), so we just prove the reverse inclusion. Let z′1 = (H(u
′, f ′), R(u′, f ′)) be
in F (z′) and z′′1 = (H(u
′′, f ′′), R(u′′, f ′′)) be in F (z′′), with f ′ and f ′′ mappings
from X to ∆f(A). Using here the convexity of ∆f(A), we simply define for each
p in X, f(p) = λu
′(p)
u(p)
f ′(p) + (1−λ)u
′′(p)
u(p)
f ′′(p). We have for each p, R(δp, f) =
λu′(p)
u(p)
R(δp, f
′) + (1−λ)u
′′(p)
u(p)
R(δp, f
′′). So R(u, f) = λR(u′, f ′) + (1 − λ)R(u′′, f ′′).
Similarly the transitions satisfy: H(u, f) = λH(u′, f ′) + (1 − λ)H(u′′, f ′′). And
we obtain that λz′1 + (1− λ)z
′′
1 = (H(u, f), R(u, f)) ∈ F (z). 
As a consequence, the graph of F is convex, and this implies the convexity of
the sets of plays. So we have obtained the following result.
Corollary 6.4. The set of plays S(z) is a convex subset of Z∞.
Looking at the definition of the payoff function r, we now obtain that l is affine
in s. Consequently, we can apply a standard minmax theorem (see e.g. Sorin
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2002 proposition A8 p.157) to obtain the existence of the value in A(m,n, z). So
wm,n(z) = infθ∈∆({1,...,n}) sups∈S(z)
∑n
t=1 θtγm,t(s). But sups∈S(z)
∑n
t=1 θtγm,t(s) is
equal to v[θm,n](z), where θ
m,n is the probability on {1, ..., m+n} such that θm,ns = 0
if s ≤ m, and θm,ns =
∑n
t=s−m
θt
t
if m < s ≤ n+m. The precise value of θm,n does
not matter much, but the point is to write: wm,n(z) = infθ∈∆({1,...,n}) v[θm,n](z). So
wm,n is 1-Lipschitz as an infimum of 1-Lipschitz mappings. The family (wm,n)m,n
is uniformly equicontinuous, and the proof of theorem 6.2 is complete. 
Remark 6.5. The following question, mentioned in Rosenberg et al., is still open.
Does there exist pure ε-optimal strategies ?
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